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ARGUMENT 
This appeal arises from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Imperial Mobile Home Park ("the Park") and against the Estate of LaRue Griffin ("the 
Estate"); accordingly, this Court should "determine only whether the trial court erred in 
applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no 
disputed issues of material fact." K & T. Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1994). 
Indeed, "[sjummary judgments present for review conclusions of law only, because, by 
definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual issues." McNair v. Farris. 944 P.2d 
392, 394 (Utah App. 1997).1 
I. The Park Did Not Meet Its Burden, As the Moving Party, Sufficient to Shift the 
Burden to the Estate to Produce Evidence. 
At the outset of this brief, it should be noted that the Park repeatedly asserts that the 
Estate does not marshall the evidence for the appellate court, and that the Estate did not 
present sufficient evidence to support its claims before the trial court. Moreover, the Park 
objects that the Estate "is requesting that the Park bear the burden of proving its case first 
. . . . The standards for summary judgment do not impose that great of burden on the 
moving party." (Appellee's brief, p. 31). 
The Park mistakenly believes that by simply moving for summary judgment and by 
attaching some affidavits and deposition excerpts, the Estate must them come forward 
1
 The Park unexplainedly intimates that "the trial court's ruling is nevertheless based 
upon the evidence presented at trial and the findings therefrom," and suggests that this 
Court should indulge considerable deference to the lower court's findings. (See 
Appellee's brief, p. 2). No trial of the merits has occurred in this case. 
1 
with evidence to support each and every element of each and every claim. This is not 
what the law requires. 
"The moving party determines the scope of a motion for summary judgment. That 
party decides what issues to present to the court for adjudication." Timm v. Dewsnup- 851 
P.2d 1178, 1181 (Utah 1993). "Thus, the moving party has an initial burden of informing 
the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying the portions of the pleadings or 
supporting documents which it believes demonstrates an absence of genuine issue of 
material fact." TS 1 Partnership v. Allred. 877 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah App. 1994); see also 
Jensen v. IHC Hosps.. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) ("On a motion for summary 
judgment, the moving party bears the burden of proof for its motion, namely, the burden of 
proving that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). 
The Park erroneously asserts that the moving party is not required to produce 
evidence in order to shift that burden to the responding party. (Appellee's brief, p. 31). 
"Unless the moving party meets its initial burden to present evidence establishing that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists, 'the party opposing the motion is under no obligation 
to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433, 
445 (Utah 1996). Indeed, "[f]ailure on the part of the moving party to meet this initial 
burden may render summary judgment inappropriate." Alfred. 877 P.2d at 158. 
Contrary to the Park's claim in its brief, the Park did not set forth facts sufficient to 
demonstrate that each of the Estate's claims were without factual support. The Park did 
2 
present some evidence, but only evidence applicable to the Estate's breach of contract 
claim, to the alleged lack of mitigation by the Estate, and to the Park's reasons for not 
uniformly enforcing its own mandatory rules. 
As previously demonstrated by the Estate in its initial brief, the Park's motion for 
summary judgment, with respect to those claims being preserved on appeal, did not 
present a challenge to the evidentiary support for the Estate's claims, but only argued that 
the asserted legal theories were not cognizable as a matter of law. As such, the Park's 
motion with respect to these claims more closely resembled a Rule 12 motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim than a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. 
In any event, the Park did not meet its initial burden such that the Estate was 
obligated to respond with its entire evidentiary arsenal to support each element of each 
cause of action asserted.2 The Estate's burden to '"set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for tr ial ' . . . is triggered only when 'a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as provided in'" Rule 56. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 
922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996); see also Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure 444 (2d. ed. 
1993) ("If, but only if, the moving party produces information that appears to establish that 
no factual dispute exists, then the responding party normally must come forward with 
materials to show that there indeed is a genuine issue of fact."). 
2
 It should be noted that a mere "conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no 
evidence to prove his case" would not likely be sufficient to meet this initial burden. 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 328 (1986) (White, J., concurring). 
3 
Accordingly, this Court should disregard the Park's references to lack of marshaling 
or lack of evidence and focus on the legal theories presented. In any event, the Estate 
believes it has presented sufficient evidence on the record to support each of the claims 
preserved on appeal. 
II. The Estate is Entitled to the Benefits of the Griffin Lease. 
The Park contends that the Estate did not raise before the trial court the issue of 
whether the Estate enjoys any rights under the Griffin lease or whether it has any lease 
with the Park at all. (See Appellee's brief, pp. 7, 10-12). This assertion is simply not 
correct. The arguments concerning the Estate's leasehold interest were argued in the 
Estate's memorandum and again at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. ($££ 
R. at 498-97; 818, Tr. at 29-31). 
Furthermore, the evidence and law undisputedly support the fact that Mrs. Griffin's 
lease became part of her Estate upon her death. The general rule of law is that "a lease is 
not terminated by the death of the lessor or the lessee unless the rule is altered by statute 
or by the terms of the lease." In re Estate of Conklin. 451 N.E.2d 1382, 1383 (111. App. 
1983); see also 42 A.L.R. 4th 963, 967 (1985) (stating "general rule" that "the death of the 
lessee does not of itself constitute an event which will terminate the contract"). 
This appears to be the law in Utah as well. $££ D&L Enters,, fac, v, Davenport, 
507 P.2d 373, 374 (Utah 1973) (agreeing with a wife's contention that her husband's death 
did not terminate the lease). Accordingly, "[u]pon the death of the tenant the unexpired 
4 
leasehold interest of the decedent becomes personal property of the estate, and does not 
automatically revert to the lessor." 49 Am.Jur. 2d, Landlord & Tenant § 287 (1995). 
Moreover, even were this not the law, the Park has essentially consented to the 
Estate continuing in possession of the premises under the Griffin lease by not sending 
notice of termination of the lease or initiating the proper procedures for evicting the 
Griffin mobile home; instead, the Park allowed the mobile home to remain in the Park and 
sent the June 10, 1996, letter expressly indicating that if the Estate paid the rent due for lot 
space #119, the Park would not "take any further action." (See Exhibit "A" in the addenda 
to Appellant's brief).3 
In any event, the Park belatedly concedes that "[t]he existence of some sort of a 
lease' is undisputed." (Appellee's brief, p. 12).4 
III. The MHPRA Does Not Expressly Grant the Park the Authority to Arbitrarily 
Create Its Own Minimum Size Specifications. 
The Park continues to argue that the only question this Court need resolve is 
whether mobile home parks have been granted express authority and discretion, under the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act (the "MHPRA"), to set and enforce minimum size 
requirements. While resolution of this issue is certainly critical to the proper 
determination of the appeal, this issue, even if answered in the affirmative, does 
3
 The Griffin mobile home has not been devised or transferred to the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as the Park suggests, but remains in the Estate. The Park 
has no support in the record for making such an assertion. 
4
 At the very least, a lease should be implied at law as the Estate has asserted in its 
initial brief and the Park has disingenuously attempted to discredit. 
5 
automatically dispose of the appeal. The issues are somewhat more varied and complex 
than the Park would like to believe. Indeed, the interpretation and construction of other 
provisions of the MHPRA are also necessary inasmuch as several of the Estate's claims are 
based on violations of those other statutory provisions. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-16-4(4) 
&-7(1) (1996). 
The Park asserts that it has the authority and discretion to set and enforce size 
requirements in accordance with the plain language of section 57-16-4(7); that the 
MHPRA should not be considered as a whole, with all of its provisions harmonized with 
the Act's goals and purposes; that the legislative history cited in the Estate's initial brief 
cannot be considered because it was not first called to the attention of the trial court; and 
that the Estate cannot now assert a statutory interpretation different from that asserted 
before the trial court. 
A, It Is For This Court Alone to Interpret the MHPRA. 
First and foremost, a question of statutory interpretation and construction present 
questions of law for the appellate court alone to decide. Durham v. Duchesne County. 893 
P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1995). No deference is given to the trial court, or to the arguments of 
the parties, in resolving a question of pure law such as this. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 
932, 937 (Utah 1994). 
"It is the duty of courts to interpret and construe statutes," and to do so correctly. 
Tygesen v. Magna Water Co.. 226 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1950). The arguments urged by 
the parties may be persuasive, but they do not somehow relieve the court of the obligation 
6 
to properly interpret the statute. Particularly, "the appellate court 'has the power and duty 
to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction.'" Drake 
v. Industrial Comm'n. 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) (quoting Pena. 869 P.2d at 936) 
(emphasis added). It would make little sense to accord private parties their own personal 
interpretations of public statutes when those statutes should have uniform application 
throughout the State of Utah. 
Accordingly, this Court has previously interpreted statutes differently from the 
interpretations urged by either party to the case. See, e ^ , State exrel. H.R.V.. 906 P.2d 
913, 915-16 (Utah App. 1995); Employers' Reinsurance Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 856 
P.2d 648, 652 & 654 (Utah App. 1993) (concluding that "[w]hile each interpretation 
[proposed by the parties] has some plausibility, neither interpretation is the correct 
interpretation" and then finding "the one permissible interpretation of the statute in 
question"). Such a result would also seem logical because the court's primary objective in 
construing a statute is to give effect to "the legislature's intent," rather than to give effect to 
the intent of the parties, as would be the case in interpreting a contract. Compare State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde. 920 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah 1996) ("Our primary 
objective is to give effect to the legislature's intent."), with Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 
P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991) ("In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are 
controlling.") 
Admittedly, the Estate did not discover prior to this appeal that the Utah legislature 
had passed, contemporaneously with the MHPRA, another statute that dealt specifically 
7 
with mobile homes at that time. Nevertheless, the interpretation of section 57-16-4(7) was 
properly at issue in this case, and the trial court had the obligation to correctly interpret 
that statute, regardless of the interpretations proposed by the parties at the time. 
The Park argued below that mobile home parks have the express authority to set 
size specifications and that by doing so, no other provision of the MHPRA could be 
violated. The Estate never conceded that the Park's interpretation and construction of the 
statute were correct; instead, the Estate argued that, at most, the statute in question granted 
some implied authority to mobile home parks, which authority could not be exercised in 
contravention of express prohibitions contained elsewhere in the MHPRA.5 
Therefore, this Court should decide for itself how the relevant provisions of the 
MHPRA should be interpreted, construed, and applied. Only the correct interpretation 
should be adopted. The parties' arguments should merely assist the Court in reaching the 
proper interpretation. 
B. Section 57-16-4(7) is Ambiguous. 
Moreover, it is proper to evaluate the legislative history in this case and to construe 
the related statutes together. Appellate courts will "generally look first to the plain 
language of the statute to discern the legislative intent." Clyde. 920 P.2d at 1186. 
However, section 57-16-4(7) is not clear and unambiguous as the Park suggests. That 
5
 The Estate has never challenged the validity or constitutionality of section 57-16-
4(7), but merely the interpretation, construction, and application of the statute. The 
Estate is not asking the Court to rule on the "reasonableness" of the legislative enactment 
as the Park suggests; accordingly, the Park's separation of powers argument is simply 
irrelevant to this appeal. 
8 
section ambiguously refers to "minimum size specifications." See Utah Code Ann. § 57-
16-4(7)(a) (1996). As previously asserted, nowhere in the MHPRA does the legislature 
define what these minimum size specifications are, or how and by whom they are to be 
adopted. The Park merely assumes that the legislature intended to grant this authority to 
the mobile home parks, but nowhere in the Act is such a grant of authority explicitly 
spelled out. The only authority allowed the parks themselves is to require that a mobile 
home be removed from the park if it fails to meet these undefined minimum size 
specifications. 
Thus, section 57-16-4(7) is ambiguous, and the meaning of "minimum size 
specifications" is unclear and uncertain. Indeed, "[a] statute is ambiguous if it can be 
understood by reasonably well-informed persons to have different meanings." Patterson v. 
Utah County Bd. of Adjustment 893 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah App. 1995); cf Equitable Life 
& Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross. 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah App. 1993) (indicating that 
"contract language may be ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or it the terms used to 
express the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible 
meanings"). 
As the Park admits, "[i]f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or 
application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirely, in 
light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and 
purpose." Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991). In addition, 
"when the statute's language is ambiguous[, the appellate court will] seek guidance from 
9 
the legislative history and policy considerations' to 'discover [legislative] intent."' Kearns-
Tribune Corp. v. Hornak 917 P.2d 79, 83 (Utah App. 1996); see also World Peace 
Movement of America v. Newspaper Agency Corp.. 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994). 
£ . It is Appropriate to Look to the Legislative History Behind the 
MHPRA's Enactment in 1981 and to Construe the Statutes In Pari 
Materia. 
The Park objects because the legislative history referred to in the Estate's initial 
brief was not presented to the trial court below. However, contrary to the Park's 
objections, the Estate is not improperly "supplementing the record" with references to 
recorded legislative proceedings. These are not evidentiary matters that must be submitted 
by a party to a court before that court can consider them. As other courts and 
commentators have recognized, a statute's "legislative history, passage, date of approval 
and the time and manner of its operation will be given judicial notice." Sands, Sutherland 
Statutory Construction § 38.06 (5th ed. 1992) (hereinafter "Sutherland"). Accordingly, 
this Court has previously researched and considered recorded legislative history on its own 
volition, even when neither party attempted to address that history. $££, £4^, Kearns-
Tribune Corp. 917 P.2d at 83-86. 
In any event, it is appropriate for this Court to consider the legislative background 
of the MHPRA in attempting to accurately discern the legislature's intent in referring to 
"minimum size specifications" in section 57-16-4(7)(a). A review of the relevant 
legislative history reveals that during the same session of the legislature in which the 
MHPRA was enacted, a statute entitled "Manufactured Housing and Recreational Vehicles 
10 
Standards" was also substantively amended. See 1981 Laws of Utah, Ch. 177 (originally 
codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-20-1 et seq.). 
That statute also dealt specifically with mobile homes, establishing definitions and 
adopting various standards to be applied to mobile homes, manufactured homes, and 
recreational vehicles. See id As commentators and courts have repeatedly recognized, 
M[o]ther statutes dealing with the same subject as the one being construed-commonly 
referred to as statutes in pari materia-comprise [a] form of extrinsic aid useful in deciding 
questions of interpretation." Sutherland at § 51.01. 
More specifically, the Utah Supreme Court has established that 
[sjtatutes are considered to be in pari materia and thus must be construed 
together when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of 
persons or things, or have the same purpose or object. If it is natural or 
reasonable to think that the understanding of the legislature or of persons 
affected by the statute would be influenced by another statute, then those 
statutes should be construed to be in pari materia, construed with reference 
to one another and harmonized if possible. 
Utah County v. Orem City. 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985) (footnotes omitted). 
Clearly, both the Mobile Home Park Residency Act and the Manufactured Housing 
and Recreational Vehicles Standards statute both related to mobile homes at the time. The 
two statutes are interrelated and, thus, should be construed together even though they dealt 
generally with different aspects of mobile homes and the mobile home industry. Indeed, 
construing similar statutes as being in pari materia is a relatively common practice in the 
judicial interpretation of statutes. See, e.g.. Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. & Loan Assoc. 
741 P.2d 542, 545 (Utah 1987); Utah County. 699 P.2d at 708-09; Murray City v. Hall. 
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663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983); Broadbent v. Board of Educ. 910 P.2d 1274, 1280 n.6 
(UtahApp. 1996).6 
The fact that the two statutes were debated and voted upon in the Utah Senate on 
the same day, March 5, 1981, and passed by the same legislature should give even more 
credence to the need to construe the statutes together. See Audio Tape Recordings of Utah 
Senate, March 5, 1981 (discussing S.B. No. 209 and S.B. No. 237). 
If the same legislative session enacts two or more acts on the same subject 
they are presumed to have been actuated by the same policy and intended to 
have effect together. The rules of construction and interpretation of acts in 
pari materia apply with singular force to enactments promulgated by the 
same legislative b o d y . . . . 
Sutherland at § 23.17 (footnotes omitted, but see also cases cited therein). 
Specifically, the 1981 Legislature defined a "mobile home,'1 in part, as "a structure 
built prior to June 15, 1976, transportable in one or more sections, which is eight body feet 
or more in width and 32 body feet or more in length." 1981 Laws of Utah, Ch. 177, § 1 
(originally codified at Utah Code Ann. § 41-20-1(2)) (emphasis added). In addition, the 
1981 Legislature specifically adopted the standards of the National Manufactured Housing 
Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401 et seq., to apply to 
mobile homes built after June 16, 1976. 1981 Laws of Utah, Ch. 177, § 1 (originally 
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 41-20-1(1)). The federal act's relevant provisions defined a 
6
 The principle that statutes in pari materia should be construed 
together is a variation of the principle that all parts of a statute should also 
be construed together. . . . 
Sutherland at §51.01. 
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mobile home built after June 16, 1976 (referred to as a "manufactured home"), in part, as 
"a structure, transportable in one or more sections, which, in the traveling mode, is eight 
body feet or more in width or forty body feet or more in length, or. when erected on site, is 
three hundred twenty or more square feet." 42 U.S.C. § 5402(6) (emphasis added). 
Therefore, when the 1981 Legislature enacted a statute that referred to "minimum 
size specifications" for mobile homes, without attempting to define those specifications, 
then the minimum sizes for mobile homes adopted by the same Legislature in another 
statute would seem the likely "specifications" to which the Legislature was referring. 
The Park considers such a conclusion to be "untenable" because the 1990 
amendments to Title 41, Chapter 20, deleted all references to mobile homes and 
manufactured homes. Thus, the statute now deals only with "recreational vehicles." See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-20-1 et seq. (1997). 
Nevertheless, the "[u]se of legislative intent as the governing criterion for 
interpretation focuses attention on circumstances and events at the time when a bill was 
enacted." Sutherland at § 49.01 (emphasis added); see, e.g.. Murphy v. Crosland. 886 
P.2d 74, 80-81 (Utah App. 1994), affd, 915 P.2d 491 (Utah 1996) (refusing to recognize 
official comments to the Model Business Corporation Act as indicative of the Utah 
Legislature's intent inasmuch as the official comments were drafted eight years after the 
Utah statute was enacted). Even if amendments to section 41-20-1 eliminated that statute's 
applicability to mobile or manufactured homes, those amendments came nine years after 
the relevant provisions were first adopted. The relevant provisions were enacted 
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contemporaneously with the MHPRA and are more likely indicative of the 1981 
Legislature's intent and understanding than any amendments in 1990. 
Moreover, f,[a]n act relating to the same subject matter need not be a valid and 
existing statute to be construed with an ambiguous act in order to help determine its 
meaning. . . . Many courts have declared that repealed . . . statutes relating to the same 
subject matter are likewise eligible to be considered in pari materia." Sutherland at § 
51.04. At least one Utah court has recognized that 
[a] general rule for the construction of statutes is that, where a part of an act 
has been repealed, it must, although of no operative force, still be taken in 
construing the rest. The propriety of comparing repealed statutes with those 
remaining in force, or subsequently enacted, for the purpose of construing 
the latter, is not to be questioned in the absence of any reference to them in 
the statute under consideration. 
QgdenCityv.BQreman, 57 P. 843, 844 (Utah 1899). 
Thus, the most plausible interpretation of what the 1981 Legislature meant by the 
"minimum size specifications" referred to in section 57-16-4(7)(a) is gleaned by reference 
to section 41-20-1, as that statute was amended by the same Legislature. Indeed, such an 
interpretation is supported by the legislature's use of the term "specifications" (which 
implies some sort of industry standard) rather than "requirements" or some other term 
which might suggest that minimum size requirements can be established by individual 
mobile home parks. Appellate courts "presume that the legislature used each word 
advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." 
Zoll & Branch. PC v Asay. 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997) (emphasis added); see also 
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V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 942 P.2d 906, 917 (Utah 1997) (indicating that 
court "must attempt to give each part of the provision a relevant and independent meaning 
so as to give effect to all of its terms"); State v. Hunt 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) 
(indicating that court will avoid interpretation which renders portions of, or words in, a 
statute superfluous or inoperative). 
Finally, inasmuch as it is reasonable to construe the 1981 statutes together and to 
infer that the 1981 legislature was referring, in the MHPRA, to the sizes established for 
mobile or manufactured homes referenced in a companion statute, it is also reasonable to 
infer that the 1981 legislature did not intend to grant any authority to mobile home parks to 
establish size specifications. Furthermore, by later eliminating section 41-20-1's 
applicability to mobile homes, the 1990 Legislature certainly did not intend to suddenly 
transfer to the mobile home parks some implied authority that did not exist before the 
amendments. If that had been the case, the 1990 legislature could have made that clear by 
also amending the MHPRA. In fact, the national standards published by the American 
National Standards Institute and National Fire Protection Association, as well as those 
adopted in the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 
1974, have existed independent of any reference to them in the Utah Code. At most, the 
1990 amendments can only be read as repealing any minimum size specifications for 
mobile homes, thus preventing mobile home parks from being able to rely on section 57-
16-4(7)(a) as a basis for requiring the removal of any mobile home upon sale. 
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D. It is Necessary to Harmonize the MHPRA's Provisions with Each Other 
and with the Act's Purposes. 
The Estate's causes of action for violations of the MHPRA are expressly based on 
violations of other provisions of the Act, specifically sections 57-16-4(4) and 57-16-7(1). 
The Park relies heavily on the flawed reasoning that because section 57-16-4(7) clearly 
and unambiguously gives mobile home parks the authority to establish minimum sizes for 
the homes and to then require the "undersized" homes be removed from the park upon 
sale, that the Park cannot, as a matter of law, violate other provisions of the MHPRA by so 
doing. 
As already established, section 57-16-4(7) is not clear and unambiguous. The 
proper interpretation of that statutory provision demonstrates that the legislature did not 
intend to give such authority and discretion to the parks. Nevertheless, even if the mobile 
home parks do have some implied discretion under the statute, that grant of authority is not 
expressly written into the plain language of the act. Because of this inherent ambiguity or 
uncertainty, contrary to the Park's assertions, it is appropriate "to analyze the act in its 
entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its 
intent and purpose." Clover. 808 P.2d at 1045; see also Murphy. 886 P.2d at 80. 
Accordingly, it is entirely appropriate, if not absolutely necessary, to harmonize the 
MHPRA's provisions and to balance the corresponding rights and obligations that apply to 
park owners and mobile home owners. The Estate has already discussed these issues in 
comprehensive detail in its initial brief. 
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Indeed, if any conflict exists between sections 57-16-4(4) and -7(1) and section 57-
16-4(7), the express prohibitions in the former sections should prevail over any implied 
discretion granted in the latter section. Indeed, "a limitation on power, declared in 
negative terms, is more apt to be given a mandatory construction and applied as an 
absolute with no exceptions or deviations tolerated than is the case with directives written 
in affirmative terms." Sutherland at § 24.02. 
Accordingly, if the practical effect of a park rule requiring the removal of mobile 
homes smaller than 12 feet by 65 feet upon sale is to prevent or unreasonably limit the 
sale, then the prohibition against such a rule or condition established in section 57-16-4(4) 
must be given force and effect. The Park disingenuously argues that section 57-16-4(7) 
does not take effect until a sale has occurred and that the other provisions of the Act thus 
have no bearing on that section because they apply before a sale occurs. This argument 
must fail. In fact, the Park admits that the rule requiring removal of undersized homes is 
enforced only once a sale is consummated "and the sale is made with the knowledge of the 
removal rule." (Appellee's brief, p. 17).7 It is precisely the knowledge that the home must 
be removed if it is purchased, combined with the Park's reliance on its rule to refuse to 
approve potential purchasers for park residency, that has the practical effect of preventing 
or unreasonably limiting the sale of the mobile home in this case. 
7
 The Park also confuses enforcement of "the subject Code sections" with 
enforcement of the Park's own rules. (Appellee's brief, p. 17). 
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IL The Unconscionability of the Parkas Rule Change Should Not Be 
Adjudicated Summarily. 
The Estate further contends that the Park's rule change in 1994 was unconscionable, 
thereby rendering the rule change invalid. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-7(1) (1996) ("No 
change in rule that is unconscionable is valid."). The Park assails this claim by asserting, 
once more, that the Estate has not marshalled any evidence to support findings of 
oppression or unfair surprise in this case. The Estate simply reiterates that "summary 
judgment resolves only questions of law;" Retherford v. AT&T Communications. 844 P.2d 
949, 958 (Utah 1992); hence, the Estate has no duty to "marshall" evidence. More 
importantly, as has been already addressed in this brief, the Estate was not required to 
present evidence to support each and every element of its claim that the Park's rule change 
was unconscionable and invalid. The Estate has articulated a valid and recognizable legal 
theory upon which equitable relief can be granted, declaring the Park's rule change 
establishing minimum size requirements to be an invalid rule change. 
Moreover, the Estate is arguing that the oppression and unfair surprise to Park 
residents occurred in 1994, at the time of the unilateral rule change. The fact that the 
Estate, or Mr. Kelsch, was not a Park resident at the time is irrelevant. Mr. Kelsch does 
not claim any unfair surprise to the Estate; although the Estate continues to be financially 
oppressed by the unilateral rule change. The Estate merely asserts that an unconscionable 
rule change is invalid. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-7(1) (1996). No legal authority 
supports the proposition that an invalid rule change somehow automatically becomes valid 
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later during the course of the lease. In any event, if the Estate is somehow barred from 
attacking the unconscionable rule change under the MHPRA, then the Estate should be 
able to attack the rule change under the UCSPA.. See id. §§ 13-11-1 et seq. Pursuant to 
that act, "[a]n unconscionable act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer 
transaction violates this act whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction." IcL 
§ 13-11-5(1) (1997) (emphasis added). Thus, the Estate could challenge an 
unconscionable rule change occurring before it acquired the Griffin lease.8 
Finally, unconscionability may be a question of law,9 but the legal determination of 
the rule change's unconscionability still depends heavily on the factual circumstances 
surrounding the change. "'Unconscionable' is a term that defies precise definition. Rather, 
a court must assess the circumstances of each particular case in light of the twofold 
purpose of the doctrine, prevention of oppression and of unfair surprise." Resource 
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch. 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, "[f]act sensitive cases such as this do not lend themselves to a determination 
on summary judgment." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 
8
 The Park repeatedly attempts to shift the focus from the Park's statutory and 
common-law obligations to mobile home owners by inaccurately describing and attacking 
Mr. Kelsch's authority and responsibilities as personal representative of the Griffin 
Estate. (£££ Appellee's brief, p. 20). No legal or factual basis supports these assertions. 
In fact, the Griffin mobile home has not been transferred to the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, but still remains part of the Griffin Estate and the responsibility of Mr. 
Kelsch. The Park's representations otherwise are unsupported by the record and untrue. 
9
 Certainly under the UCSPA, "[t]he unconscionability of an act or practice is a 
question of law for the court." Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-5(2) (1997). 
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1995). The trial court should be required to review all the facts and evidence surrounding 
the rule change before determining that the rule change was not unconscionable as a 
matter of law. 
IV. The Park's Unjustified Refusal to Approve Any Subtenant Breaches the 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
The Estate has asserted repeatedly that a breach of good faith and fair dealing has 
occurred, and continues to occur, as a result of the Park's absolute refusal to allow any 
sublessee or caretaker to reside in the Griffin mobile home while the home remains in the 
Park. (Sfi£ R. at 495; 489; 818, Tr. at 35-36, 39-40, and 42-43). Nevertheless, the Park 
has virtually ignored this issue at every step of the way, including in its appellate brief. 
Never has the Park even attempted to offer any justification or explanation for its absolute 
and unconditional refusal to allow a sublessee. 
Instead, the Park argues that the Estate's argument that the Park is attempting to 
constructively evict the Griffin mobile home is being asserted for the first time on appeal. 
Again, this contention is simply inaccurate. Indeed, at oral arguments before the trial 
court, counsel for the Estate plainly declared, "Now, what's going on in this case really, 
your Honor, is that this is an attempt to cause a constructive eviction, because they're 
trying to prevent anyone from living in the home and requiring [it] to be moved upon 
sale." (R. 818, Tr. at 40). Even if the references to "attempted constructive eviction" are 
few, the actual conduct complained of (the refusal to allow anybody to reside in the 
Griffin mobile home while in the Park) has been asserted from the beginning of this case. 
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(See record cites in first paragraph of this section.) It is simply a fact that the practical 
effect of the Park's refusal is a denial of the full leasehold interest to the Estate and the 
imposition of financial hardship in an obvious attempt to constructively evict the Griffin 
home from the Park. 
The Park's argument that it is simply exercising express contractual rights does not 
justify the Park's conduct as a matter of law. Utah courts have unequivocally "determined 
that a party must exercise express rights awarded under a contract reasonably and in good 
faith." Olympus Hills Center v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers. 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah 
App. 1994) (emphasis added); PDQ Lube Center. Inc. v. Huber. 949 P.2d 792, 798 (Utah 
App. 1997). 
The express provision of the Griffin lease agreement establishes the "Resident shall 
not assign, transfer or sublet the site or any part thereof, or this Rental Agreement, without 
Landlord's prior written consent." (See Exhibit "C" in addenda to Appellant's brief). 
Nevertheless, the Park has indicated that it will not allow anyone to reside in the mobile 
home and, thus, will not under any circumstance give its prior written consent. It is 
simply not clear what contractual "right" is being exercised by the Park. 
The case of Howe v. Professional ManivestT Inc.. relied on by the Park, is 
distinguishable from our case and therefore inapposite. See 829 P.2d 160 (Utah App. 
1992). In Howe, the lessee sought the landlord's approval after the lease was already 
assigned, when the lease required prior consent of the landlord. L± at 163-64. In essence, 
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the mere act of assignment constituted a breach of the lease by the lessee, who could not 
then assert breach of good faith and fair dealing on the part of the landlord. Id. 
The Park further objects that the Estate has "no reasonable expectations involved in 
the lease." (Appellee's brief, p. 23). Nevertheless, every party to a contract has the "right 
to receive the fruits of the contract." Huber, 949 P.2d at 797. Certainly, at a minimum, 
the use and enjoyment of the leased premises are "fruits" of any residential lease. Indeed, 
"all leases" are subject to an "implied covenant of quiet enjoyment." Richard Barton 
Enters, v. TsenL 928 P.2d 368, 374 (Utah 1996). Accordingly, "constructive eviction 
occurs where a tenant's right of possession and enjoyment of the leased premises is 
interfered with by the landlord." Brugger v. Fonoti. 645 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1982); see 
also Barker v. Utah Oil Refining Co.. 178 P.2d 386, 388 (Utah 1947). The Estate is not 
being allowed full use and possession of the premises by not being allowed to have 
someone occupy the mobile home. 
Contrary to the Park's assertions, the Estate's justified expectations are relevant. 
"To comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a party's actions must 
be consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the other 
party." Huber. 949 P.2d at 797-98 (emphasis added). The Estate certainly expected to 
receive the basic "fruits" of a residential lease.10 
10
 Based on the June 10, 1996 letter which indicated that if rent was paid, the Park 
would take no "further action," the Estate also has the justifiable expectation that the Park 
would not attempt to constructively evict the Griffin mobile home. 
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It is worth noting that some jurisdictions have specifically imposed upon a landlord 
"a duty to accept a suitable subtenant when offered." Conklin, 451 N.E.2d at 1382. In 
Conklin. that duty was imposed upon the landlord when the deceased tenant's estate had 
ceased paying the rent for the premises. IdL Similarly, Utah courts have held "that a 
landlord who seeks to hold a breaching tenant liable for unpaid rents has an obligation to 
take commercially reasonable steps to . . . ordinarily . . . relet the premises." Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 906 (Utah 1989). It stands to reason that if the 
Estate were to stop paying rent, in which situation the Park would then have a duty to 
accept a suitable subtenant offered by the Estate or else to take affirmative steps to relet, 
that the Park should also be obligated to accept a suitable subtenant offered by the Estate 
when the rent is being paid and the Estate is not in breach of the lease. 
In any event, the Park was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the 
Estate's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
V. The Estate's Other Issues Have Been Adequately Presented 
With respect to the Estate's claim for violation of the UCSPA, the Estate believes 
the issues were adequately addressed in its initial brief The Estate would simply call the 
Court's attention to the fact that claims of unconscionability are highly fact-dependent and 
ill-suited for disposition on summary judgment, as has already been addressed. Moreover, 
an unconscionable act or practice violates the Act if it occurs "before, during, or after the 
transaction;" in other words, before, during or after the Park's leasing of lot space #119 to 
the Estate. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-5(1) (1997). 
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Moreover, the Estate's arguments respecting intentional interference with economic 
relations and the issue of mitigation of damages have been adequately addressed in the 
Estate's initial brief 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals set aside the summary 
judgment of the trial court which granted Appellee's request for a declaratory relief and 
dismissed Appellant's counterclaims for violations of the MHPRA, and the UCSPA, for 
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and for intentional interference with 
economic relations. Appellant further requests that the case be remanded for trial or other 
proceedings in the district court, with express guidance on the interpretation, construction, 
and application of the relevant statutes and case law. 
Dated this Z?? day of April, 1998. 
GREENWOOD & RfcAGK 
CHRIS/D. GREENW0OD 
JAMES KMIASLAM 
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class, postage pre-paid, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing, REPLY BRIEF to 
James R. Boud, the counsel for the appellee in this matter, at the following address: 
JAMES R. BOUD 
Ashton, Braunberger & Boud, P.C. 
765 East 9000 South, Suite Al 
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